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Court extended the power to consider these factors to water rights administration. The Court stated that preventing the Director from considering whether
a senior rights holder is putting their water to beneficial use would be to ignore
the constitutional requirement that only to those using the water enjoy priority
over the water. The Court also noted that the Director has discretionary authority in water management and administration cases that is not available in a
water rights case. The Court reasoned that reasonableness is not an element of
a water right, so evaluation of whether a diversion is reasonable in the administration context should not be a re-adjudication. The application of established
evidentiary standards, legal presumptions, and burdens of proof tempers the
Director's discretion. The senior rights holder is not required to prove their
entitlement to the water. The rules do allow the Director to use various tools,
including baseline methodology, to determine how diversion can impact other
water sources.
Groundwater Appropriators and the City argued there is no basis in Idaho
law to require use of the clear and convincing evidence standard as opposed to
the preponderance of the evidence standard. They both requested the establishment of the preponderance of the evidence standard as the appropriate
standard. The Court readily dispensed with the evidentiary issue by citing A&B
Irr.Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, stating a longstanding rule that
clear and convincing evidence must support changes to a decree. The Court
saw no reason to change this established precedent.
The Court concluded the Director had authority to use a baseline methodology to determine whether to initiate administrative proceedings or to manage
the water resources. The Court also concluded that the district court had applied the correct evidentiary standard. The Court therefore affirmed the district
court ruling, and allowed the Director to proceed with the water management
and administration plan.
PeterAlmaas

MONTANA
Heavirland v. State, 311 P.3d 813 (Mont 2013). (holding (i) Montana case
law applies retroactively in determining sufficiency of evidence rebutting the presumption of abandonment of water rights founded on a prolonged time of nonuse, and (ii)claimants provided sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of
abandonment and excuse twenty-four years of nonuse of irrigation rights).
Frank Truchot filed and perfected the subject water right in 1904. Under
this right, Truchot diverted water from Muddy Creek for irrigation. Christina
and Henry Weist purchased the water right in 1913. Their son, Ray Weist,
took over the farm and continued to utilize the water right for flood irrigation,
when available, from the mid-1940's until 1961. Utilization of the right was
particularly difficult because of the slope and heavy clay soil of the Weists' fields.
Ray stopped irrigating in 1962. His son, Lyle, stated that his father's age and
the inefficiency of flood irrigation were the reasons Ray stopped irrigating. Lyle
also testified that Ray had three-phase power connected to the farm to accommodate potential future pivot irrigation.
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Lyle returned to and purchased the family farm in 1975. After researching
the farm's water rights history, in 1981 Lyle and his wife, Linda, filed a statement
of claim in the Montana general stream adjudication. Lyle installed a fourteentower Valley Center Pivot and resumed irrigation in 1981-82. He continued to
use the pivot until 1991, when he sold the water right and property to Loren
and Sue Heavirland. The Heavirlands thereafter irrigated every year but one,
when water was unavailable.
Lyle and Linda Weist's claim appeared in the Temporary Preliminary Decree for Basin 410 with attached Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) issue remarks. The remarks noted that the 1962 Teton
County Water Resource Survey and the 1978 USDA Aerial Photography indicated zero acres irrigated at the farm. Meetings between DNRC and the Weists
did not resolve the issue remarks. DNRC Water Resource Specialist Kraig Van
Voast ("water master") reviewed the documentation and found he did not have
information that could resolve the lack of proof of irrigation from Muddy Creek.
The water master therefore joined the State of Montana in the adjudication.
The State moved for partial summary judgment regarding the issue of abandonment and the water master granted the motion. The water master found that
the period of nonuse from 1962 to 1982 raised a rebuttable presumption of
abandonment.
At an evidentiary hearing, the water master found the Weists had abandoned the water right, stating that the Weists' and Heavirlands' (together,
"claimants") evidence did not overcome their burden to rebut the presumption
of intent to abandon the water right. Claimants then filed an objection with the
ChiefJudge of the Montana Water Court ("water court"). Claimants presented
two central arguments: (i) the law as it stood in 1973 applied to the abandonment
of then-existing water rights, meaning the water master erred in retroactively applying 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch to their existing water right; and (ii) even if 79
Ranch applied, the claimants offered evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption and excuse the twenty years of nonuse.
The water court first held that 79 Ranch applied to the case at hand. 79
Ranch states that a long period of nonuse creates a presumption of intent to
abandon a water right and causes the burden of explaining the nonuse to shift
to the claimant. 79Ranch also requires a claimant present concrete facts or conditions excusing the nonuse, not just wants and wishes to utilize the right, to
rebut the presumption of abandonment. The water court then applied 79
Ranch and concluded the water master erred in not finding the evidence was
sufficient to rebut the presumption of intent to abandon. The State appealed to
the Montana Supreme Court ("Court").
The first question the Court examined was whether the water court correctly
found 79 Ranch applied to the abandonment of a water right that predated that
case. The Court noted that the 1973 Montana Constitution, as well as the state's
Water Use Act, protects "existing rights." But the Court went on to hold that
79Ranch did not run counter to the state constitution's protection of those rights
and did not change or create new law; rather, 79 Ranch clarified the standard
for abandonment, meaning its retroactive application did not offend the claimants' rights or Montana law. Thus, the Court concluded the water court correctly held Montana law did not bar retroactive application of 79 Ranch.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

427

The second question the Court addressed was whether the water court
properly held the claimants presented adequate evidence to show they did not
intend to abandon their water right. The State argued the evidence presented
was insufficient because (i) the claimants did not offer adequate evidence to
show Ray stopped irrigating his property because of his age or health; and (ii)
the connection of three-phase power to the property did not necessarily indicate
intent to install a pivot irrigation system.
The Court held the claimants' presentation of the difficulty of flood irrigation on the property, coupled with Lyle's testimony regarding his father's age
and health, were sufficient to overcome the presumption of abandonment. The
Court stated there was no reason to doubt Lyle's statements about his father and
the property. The Court also found Ray's installation of a pivot irrigation system
was proof enough of his father's belief that Lyle would want to use that type of
system. The Court also stated that Lyle's subsequent irrigation with the new
system supported the notion that the Weists did not intend to abandon the water
right. Weighing the evidence presented in its totality, the Court held the water
court correctly concluded that the water master erred in finding a lack of sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to abandon the water right.
The Court therefore affirmed the water court's decision to apply 79Ranch
retroactively. The Court also affirmed the water court's conclusion that the
claimants presented evidence sufficient to justify the decades-long nonuse and,
therefore, enough to rebut the presumption of abandonment.
Lauren Bushong
Hughes v. Hughes, 305 P.3d 772 (Mont. 2013) (holding (i) the lower court

had jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged stock water easement; (ii) partition of
land does not extinguish existing water rights on other land unless the parties
intended such a result; and (iii) an implied easement was the appropriate rem-

edy to allow continued use of the stock water right).
The Supreme Court of Montana ("Court") reviewed various complaints
Jack and Shirley Hughes ("Jack") filed against their son, Johnny Hughes
("Johnny"). The Tenth Judicial District Court ("lower court") consolidated
Jack's complaints, which concerned money he loaned to Johnny, an alleged
stock water easement following a partition of jointly-owned land, and a disputed
pasture lease. The lower court found in favor of Johnny on all matters except

the water rights issue. Jack appealed the non-water issues and Johnny crossappealed the stock water issue.
These disputes arose in the wake of a falling-out between Jack and Johnny
and the subsequent referee-supervised property partition. In separate deeds
dated 1984, 1985, and 1986, Jack granted Johnny an undivided fifty-six percent
interest in Melby Ranch but retained a life estate in the buildings and improvements. Thus, at the time of partition in 2011, Jack and Johnny owned Melby
Ranch as tenants in common. In light of their falling-out, the parties engaged
three referees to partition the land. Jack and Johnny agreed that Johnny would
receive the section of Melby Ranch that included Flatwillow Creek although

Jack had previously acquired an adjudicated water right to use Flatwillow Creek
for stock water purposes. The parties agreed to fence their boundaries to better

